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The End of the End of History: Some Epitaphs for Liberalism 
 
Two L iberalisms Revisited  
In 2006 a certain form of liberal international law reached its apotheosis with the publication of 
The Princeton Project’s Forging a World of Liberty Under Law.1  This set of desiderata, given the 
imprimatur of the U.S. foreign policy elite and working in the spirit of George Kennan, 
represented a distillation of the themes present in a form of muscular liberalism that seemed 
ascendant then but is, perhaps, less obviously visible or self-confident now. Indeed, the 
European Society of International Law meeting in Tallinn, from which these papers are drawn, 
seemed to have been convened not to praise this liberalism but to give it a decent burial. The 
papers themselves – each, in its own way, an epitaph for a certain form of liberal hubris – were 
keen to advertise their scepticism about liberal claims (sometimes normativity itself) and about 
liberalism’s close association with the various forms of Western domination. Rather than the end 
of history, then, we have the end of the end of history.   
In this essay, I want to explore some questions about liberalism arising from these papers. But 
first, what exactly does it mean to be a liberal? That, as Michael Oakeshott puts it, “is anyone’s 
guess”.2  So, let me guess.3 In an essay called “Two Liberalisms”, published in the European 
Journal of International Law over ten years ago, I contrasted two forms of liberalism: Charter 
liberalism and liberal anti-pluralism.4 I won’t repeat what I said there except to say that these two 
liberalisms seemed to differ in their attitude towards sovereignty - with one (Charter liberalism) 
apparently deferring to sovereign desire or “domestic jurisdiction”, and the other (liberal anti-
pluralism) demonstrating a willingness to penetrate (some) sovereigns in order to pursue liberal 
ambitions.5  
In retrospect, that paper missed something rather complicated about these two liberalisms. 
Charter liberalism, it turns out, is far less liberal or deferential than the paper suggested. The 
regime established in the Charter, and particularly in Chapter VII and in combination with 
Article 103, in fact disposes of domestic jurisdiction quite early on with a dual reference to its 
centrality (Article 2(7) and then, almost immediately, its elasticity (see also, Article 39-42). So, 
Charter liberalism announces sovereignty as the basis of the United Nations Organisation and 
then sets about providing a series of ways in which it might be degraded. Liberal anti-pluralists, 
meanwhile, are usually a bit divided on the universalizability of liberal intervention: seeking it 
there, resisting it here, sovereigntist at this time, anti-sovereigntist at another time.  
                                                          
1 G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton Project Final Report (2006) at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report.html 
2 M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other essays, (1991) at 439.  
3 Here, I have not offered a political philosophy of liberalism. Such a definition would emphasise liberalism’s 
relationship to individual freedom or rights, or the role of the state and so on. Some of this work is undertaken in a 
paper in this collection by Oleksandr Merezhko (“Ideology of Liberalism and International Law”).      
4
 “Two Liberalisms”, 12(3) European Journal of International Law, (2001) 537-571. 
5 This point is made by Phil Chan in his chapter: “As they proclaim that State sovereignty as a principle of 
international law has become obsolete, Western States and scholars assert that their States’ sovereignty must be 
protected at all costs”. (Chan) 
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It might be better, then, borrowing from Oakeshott, to divide liberals into prescriptive liberals 
(my term) and conversational liberals.6 According to Oakeshott, prescriptive liberals are 
interested in defining the parameters or limits of politics (Rawls) or government (Nozick) from 
foundational principles (Kant) while conversational liberals are wedded to exploratory forms of 
reasoning and tentative conclusions. Political discourse, as John Gray puts it in support of this 
latter liberalism, is “…not an argument but a conversation”.7 At its most argumentative (though 
I think he means assertive or doctrinaire here) it becomes totalitarian or a form of 
“fundamentalist liberalism”.8  
Gray is hostile to the legalist turn in democratic politics. The combination of a corrupted and 
uncompromising political discourse with a continual reversion to constitutional argument has led 
to deficiencies in both realms. What is lost in this to-ing and fro-ing between an aggressive 
politics of enmity and a legal politics founded on “the absurd device of a Bill of Rights” is a 
sense of non-instrumental civic association: citizens living together and dedicating their public 
lives to the project of living together. Oakeshott’s distinction between a civil association and an 
enterprise association are instructive here, surely.  In the case of the former, the purpose is 
civility, civic-mindedness and co-existence. The latter form of association – corporations, trade 
unions, most Western governments today – is dedicated to certain specified ends or purposes 
(profit, worker’s rights, economic growth). 
The implications for our thinking about international law are not immediately obvious. Perhaps 
one way to approach these ideas from the perspective of international law is to think about the 
attitude of liberal international law to legalism in a more specific sense. On one hand, liberal 
international law is bound up with legalist responses to international (dis)order. The whole 
Wilsonian experiment with international dispute resolution, principles of self-determination and 
bureaucratised international law was described as “liberal”, and this form of liberalism in its more 
pragmatic variants still dominates mainstream thought in international law. When Wight, in his 
famous tripartite scheme, describes (legal) rationalists he associates them with a brand of lawful 
international relations or a civic association with law.9 On the other hand, more recent variants 
of liberalism have been impatient with some strands of legalism. “Forging a World of Liberty 
under Law” is one thing but the law in question is not necessarily international law as it is 
currently configured. The Princeton Project reveals a frustration with the way in which Charter 
law constrains the use of force (by insisting on a veto, or by understanding self-defence too 
restrictively or by failing to allow regional bodies to use force independent of any collective 
authorisation on the part of the Council or by rendering impermissible certain types of 
humanitarian force).   
The liberalism represented by Slaughter et al seems drawn to an enterprise association (“that 
mode of association constituted by shared adherence to a common enterprise”) marked by 
commitment to substantive ends of a certain form of liberalism (human rights, “an American 
way of life” (Princeton at 15), democratic elections and so on) whereas Charter liberalism’s 
apparent agnosticism sits more comfortably with the civic association in which states manage to 
                                                          
6 John Gray, “Oakeshott as a Liberal”, Gray’s Anatomy, (2008). 
7 Ibid 79. 
8 Ibid 79. 
9 Wight, “An Anatomy of International Thought”, 13 Review of International Studies, (1987) 221-227.  
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live together under a set of rules designed to ensure cooperation, co-existence and peace rather 
than a “hierarchy of ends”.10 This relationship of course plays out, too, when liberal states are 
confronted with illiberal challenges domestically. To what extent should the hierarchy of ends 
prevail over procedural commitments to freedom of expression and so on? This is a theme taken 
up in Veronika Bilkova’s interesting paper on the way in which post-Soviet liberal states have 
tried to restrict the use of illiberal symbols. In the Czech Republic, for example, it was illegal to 
display communist symbols if these symbols had a tendency to “preach the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the leading role of the party”11 
Liberal Claims 
In any event, Oakeshott’s distinction seems richer than the liberalisms one encounters in the 
international law. Indeed, the liberalism deployed in some of the international law literature then 
seems a bit thin in general when set against the variegation found elsewhere. Many theories of 
liberalism are either excessively formalistic (Marks, Chan), or fail to see how democracy might 
work against liberalism (see Phil Chan’s discussion of Western antipathy towards democratically 
elected governments in Palestine, in Venezuela, in Algeria and in Austria) or against human 
rights (Chan, again) or are over-dependent on progressivist accounts of history. 12 Meanwhile, the 
passionate ideological struggles of the post-war era (between redistributive Atlee-style liberalism 
and Eisenhower-era American liberalism, or between Scandinavian welfarism, French dirigisme 
and Reaganite and Thatcherite forms of liberalism) is flattened out in favour of a procedural 
liberalism. (It was a relief then to detect in the papers here the possibility of rival, contested 
liberalisms (in, say, the pronouncements of the Russian diplomatic elite (Roele, p11-13))). In 
addition, there was a sense in Tallinn that there was a need to make explicit the different levels of 
claims being made by new liberals. These operated at three different levels. First, there were two 
sets of empirical claims. The first revolves around the apparent difference in behaviour between 
liberal and illiberal state with the former said to be, on the whole, law-abiding, responsive to the 
regulation of international organisations and pacific. The second is a claim about the 
disaggregation of the state itself into its domestic constituencies (Moravcsik) or into different 
legislative, regulatory or judicial components each working across state boundaries to create an 
international expert class (Slaughter). The first empirical claim was subject to a comprehensive 
critique by Jose Alvarez in his 2001 article. I expressed some doubts about the second claim and 
the implications of it in an essay in the Oxford Handbook of International Relations.13 
Alongside the empirical claims of liberal international law and relations, there are, of course, a 
host of normative propositions about the desirability of promoting a liberal peace or a form of 
negarchy (Deudney) within or between states. But these normative claims have often been either 
subsequently denied or lack a basis in anything except a set of empirical developments.14 As 
commentators have pointed out it is not clear why we should adopt a suspicious attitude to the 
                                                          
10 Gray at 81. 
11 Czech Republic, Police Notification, No. KRPL-15450-6/TC-2011-181171, 3 February 2012. 
12 Thomas. Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, (2009); 
Susan Marks, ‘The End of History: Reflections on Some International Legal Theses” 3 EJIL (1997) 449-477.   
13 G. Simpson, “The ethics of the new liberalism” in C. Reus-Smit, D. Snidal (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations (2008) 255-266. 
14 Christian Reus-Smit, “The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory,’ 12 (3) European Journal of International 
Law,  573-593. 
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state or design liberal institutions around these preferences simply because it is being challenged 
from above and below. Nor is it at all obvious that the rise of transnational elites has facilitated 
progress in the areas of war and peace, poverty and, in particular, global warming and 
environmental degradation.15 Nor is it obvious that international law should rest on the desires 
of liberal states or the inclinations of regulatory expert classes, or, even, domestic preferences. 
Compatibility with the expansion of capital or substantive conceptions of fairness would be two 
other possible contenders.  
Finally, there is a set of explicitly programmatic ideas. At least two have been prominent in 
liberal thinking. The first is the idea of a Concert of Democratic States capable of projecting, and 
authorised to use, force in the absence of Security Council approval. This idea institutionalises 
the democratic peace and provides cover for extra-curricular intervention (Princeton, 26). Its 
membership would be self-selecting rather than selective. The Princeton Paper envisages Mexico 
as a member (27). This sort of liberal confidence provokes considerable anxiety among critics. It 
combines a blithe disregard for the substance of lives lived on the ground (Mexico’s drug war 
against its own people is rendered irrelevant, its paper thin democratic credentials (largely 
meaningless periodic elections) are, as ever, the supervening consideration) with a wish to 
increase the opportunities to project force. The second – closely associated idea – relates to the 
R2P doctrine. Again, the idea is to extend the parameters of lawful – or, legitimate –  force in 
defence of liberal values or to prevent either genocide or, at least, gross and systematic violations 
of human rights.  Such proposals are easy targets for those with suspicious inclinations.  Much 
has been written about T2P and, to a significantly lesser extent, the Concert of Democracies (an 
idea that has gained far less traction in general). It would be pointless adding to this now.  
Against Prescription  
On the whole, the papers in this collection seem to be wary of Oakeshott’s prescriptive 
liberalism. In some respects this all comes down to a general split in the field of international law 
itself. Martin Wight wondered aloud at the end of his classic essay “An Anatomy of International 
Thought” whether the differences between realists, rationalists, and revolutionists might not be a 
matter of temperamental inclination. As he put it: realists have a sense of proportion, rationalists 
a sense of responsibility and revolutionists a sense of injustice.16  When it comes to liberalism, 
then, there are two temperaments or sets of political commitments. To put it quite bluntly, when 
one group of people look out into the European-North American public realm world they see 
human rights, the rule of law, free markets, and a decent life, and they hope to export these 
progressive values (or in stronger version they look out at the global political economy and see 
an expanding sphere of freedom and economic well-being liberated from the constraints of 
history). Another group sees empire, exploitation, or war, or colonialism, or violence. And whole 
research agendas are built around this distinction. To read, say, Anne-Marie Slaughter’s New 
World Order against, say, Sundhya Pahuja’s Decolonizing International Law is to see two different 
worlds being described (and yet they are the same worlds). For some the “rule of law is death, 
violence, blood” (China Mieville), for others it represents a hopeful future. Here there is a sort of 
pre-intellectual commitment that is as situational as it is intellectual. How else can we explain the 
                                                          
15 G. Simpson, 'What is to be done? Who is to do it?' (2004) 15 Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 384-499. 
16 Wight, “Anatomy”.  
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differences between Ferguson on one hand, and, say, Richard Gott and John Newsinger on the 
other? In Ferguson’s work, British liberal empire was largely a positive experience through which 
the UK bequeathed parliamentary democracy to its commonwealth allowing some states to 
flourish (Australia, New Zealand) while others made the mistake of rejecting the Crown 
inheritance and fell into oligarchy or dictatorship. It was mainly liberal with a smattering of 
empire. In the case of Gott et al, it is largely empire with very little of what we might call 
liberalism. Bill Bowring dissects this literature and the score-card of British empire and concludes 
(though he is not explicit about this) that liberal empires are no less violent and repressive than 
some of their competitors. Comparing Russian empire in the near East with Britain’s behaviour 
in India (where one author has argued, 10 million dies at the hands of the British over a period 
of ten years) he states:  
“Though I cannot resist observing that life in Soviet Central Asia was much more 
civilised and material conditions were much better than those in the British Indian 
Empire immediately to the south. And democracy, human rights and the free market 
were implemented to a similar extent.” (at 6)17  
This relationship between empire and liberalism worried a lot of the scholars in Tallinn. Phil 
Chan saw similarities between liberal interventionism in the 21st century and the way in which 
rhetoric around the “family of nations” in the 19th was relied upon to justify colonisation and 
possession.18 Isobel Roele pointed to the sheer hubris of the Western powers. She describes the 
way in which the Lithuanian representative (also representing this hubris) characterised the use 
of the veto in the Syrian situation: ‘Today’s veto is a stand on the wrong side of justice and 
accountability — a stand on the wrong side of humanity’.19  
Liberal/Illiberal 
In Tallinn a number of people wondered if the distinction between liberal and non-liberals states, 
or between democratic and undemocratic states really matters that much anymore, or is in any 
way constitutive, because other distinctions between states matter more (North-South, East-
West, Great Powers-Outlaws, “bigness-smallness” ((Merezhko) or because social and political 
divisions within states were so such more salient (the rise of the offshore class, the shared values 
of transnational elites) or because of a general intensification in legal regulation or because such 
distinctions were too crude and insufficiently varied to capture the diverse forms of government 
on the ground.20 It is clear, for example, that “emerging democracies” have very special and 
distinctive features: a kind of qualified liberalism. Laura-Maria Craciunean, in her informative 
account of Romania’s post-cold war transition, shows how the transplantation of liberal norms 
has to be made to work “each and every single day” (1), how this is constantly a matter of 
                                                          
17 The figures on India are quoted by Bowring and drawn from Randeep Ramesh “India's secret history: 'A 
holocaust, one where millions disappeared...”. Author says British reprisals involved the killing of 10m, spread over 
10 years” The Guardian 24 August 2007, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/24/india.randeepramesh 
(accessed on 20 May 2014) 
18 Chan, around fn 92. 
19 UN Doc. S/PV.7180 (22 May 2014) p. 10 
20 Even the Princeton project document concedes that democracy, for example, might produce adverse 
consequences for international order though this speaks of a general distrust for popular sentiment in the non-
Western world. Venezuelans might expropriate or nationalise their mineral wealth; Iranians might become 
nationalistic and adopt an even more threatening nuclear posture (at 19).     
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negotiation (sometimes with international advisory bodies (the Venice Commission in the case of 
Romania) playing a prodding, persuasive role and how “literal” transplantation can only 
accomplish so much in the absence of cultural transformation.    
It may be the case, too, that states are liberal in some spheres and illiberal in others and that this 
is more closely related to features inherent in the sphere in question than to the internal 
dynamics of the state itself.  Jose Alvarez has remarked that many human rights violators are 
compliant and “liberal” when it comes to international economic and trade agreements.21  And, 
following the lead of Alvarez’s 2001 essay in the European Journal of International Law, there 
seemed to be a wide acceptance that liberals do behave badly or that the distinction does not 
operate in a very linear fashion.  
Isobel Roele’s paper proposes a different principle of distinction: one based not on the illiberality 
of deviant states but on their incorrigibility.  This captures something about the current practice 
of the global elites and avoids some of the taint of the liberal-illiberal distinction. It is certainly 
the case that interventions in Serbia, Iraq and Libya had less to do with the liberal or democratic 
credentials of those states or even their tendency to violate human rights standards, and more to 
do with a growing impatience about the failure of these governments to pay any heed to 
successive Security Council resolutions (hence the continual references to the “13 resolutions” 
passed in relation to Iraq before that intervention). It is true, too, as Roele argues, that the 
Russians and Chinese would be much more likely to acquiesce in authorising resolutions if the 
debate was framed in terms of incorrigibility rather than liberalism. At present, the references to 
the rule of law, human rights and democracy, derived from liberal international law, sound tired 
and inauthentic, and, in any case, are alienating half the membership of the Security Council.22 
These tend now to be combined with the familiar Council refrain of calling for the prosecution 
of leading members of the regime in question.23 Thus does the ICC risk become the judicial wing 
of NATO (or the relevant interveners). More to the point, though, according to Roele, the 
increasingly resort to punitive humanitarianism is simply not working as a tactical device for 
getting the Council to act.  An alternative, as Roele argues, is to adopt a Foucaldian approach 
based on the based on the microphysicality of disciplinary prescriptions and “the disciplinary 
mechanisms of surveillance and assessment”(at 15). It is unusual to see Foucault used in this way 
since his work explicitly problematizes the move to “humane” or gradualist forms of punishment 
                                                          
21 Jose Alvarez, ‘Trade and the Environment: Implications for Global Governance: How Not to Link: Institutional 
Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime’, 7, Widener Law Symposium Journal (2001) 1. On the other hand, as 
Vladislav Mulyun notes on his paper, litigation around human rights violations linked to infringements of WTO 
commitments and obligations may produce a liberalism by stealth even within illiberal states like Russia, Mulyun, 
“Liberalism in International Trade, Illiberalism in Domestic Economic Governance, and Human Rights Protection 
in the Context of WTO”.   The relationship between international law and domestic law is the stuff of treatises, of 
course. Leonid Tymchenko, in his essay on Ukraine, shows how the Ukrainian Constitution contains traces of liberal 
international law (“International Legal Norms in the System of Ukrainian Constitution”) and how a state might seek 
to modernise through the absorption of international legal technique into its constitutional apparatus and judicial 
practice.   
22 See e.g. French Statement in UNSC meeting at UN Doc. S/2012/6810 (19 July 2012). 
23 UN Doc. S/PV.7180 (22 May 2014). See, in the case of Libya, SCR 1970.  
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and control. Still, the move from liberalism to incorrigibility seems politically promising from the 
perspective of those who demand Council action in cases like Syria.24   
When it comes to liberal and illiberal states, the Tallinn papers of course usefully expanded our 
usual concerns in the direction of taking the large, emerging powers more seriously. Wim 
Muller’s essay on China asks how an “illiberal” state might be socialised into the liberal 
international order or to what extent illiberal authoritarian free(ish) market hegemons like China 
might offer alternative models of international order or might modify the existing one.25 The 
conclusion here is that China (including more latterly the PRC) has tended to deploy the 
conceptual apparatus of thin Charter liberalism in order to protect itself from the intrusions of 
imperial power (sovereign equality as a barrier foreign intervention and meddling) or the 
excessive scrutiny of the human rights system (carving out a liberal “private sphere” as a way of 
protecting China’s internal affairs).26 On the other hand, the appeal of liberal international law 
has not extended to strong support for a more substantive “rule of law” in international 
relations. The Chinese have not latterly been enthusiastic about international adjudication 
viewing it as an encroachment into sovereignty and so on. We can think here of China’s refusal 
to countenance various forms of “liberal” 
dispute resolution in its conflicts over territory in the South China Seas and the Spratly Islands. 
But this caution when it comes to the rule of law is not exclusive to illiberal states. Liberal and 
illiberal states alike have been resistant to various forms of thin and thick constitutionalism. The 
key split here may be between Great Powers and other states with the Great Powers far more 
reluctant to expose themselves to forms of adjudication while they pursue their interests and 
protect their often extensive political and material resources. China may simply be a classic Great 
Power in this regard, more akin to the United States than, say, an illiberal small power like 
Belarus. Indeed, it may not even be the case that small illiberal states are always allergic to 
adjudication. A glance at the ICJ’s late-20th  and early 21st century docket reveals some surprising 
names among the litigant states. There has even been a propensity for states thought of as 
somehow rogue or outlaw to pursue highly legalistic claims in court. Obvious examples would 
include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (in its cases against Belgium and 
Rwanda/Uganda), Serbia (in its action against the states of NATO), and Iran’s various stoushes 
with the United States. It may be, too, that the distinction between emergent democracies and 
old democracies might be of some relevance in assessing the way in which states behave 
domestically and internationally. We can think of Veronika Bilkova paper here and its description 
of the very illiberal practices of some post-Soviet states in relation to freedom of expression (e.g. 
at 4-7) or Gleb Bogush’s illuminating survey of Russia’s “cautious” approach to international 
criminal law (an approach still influenced, he claims, by Soviet thinking) or Jernej Cernic’s lament 
for the failings of formal legal liberalism (e.g. the non-execution of European Court of Human 
Rights judgments in some Eastern European states).27  
                                                          
24 Roele recognises this at the end of her essay.  
25 Muller, “China: An Illiberal, Non-Western State in a Western-centric, Liberal Order”, at 1.  
26 See Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law (2000) for a critique of this private space in 
international relations.  
27 As Bogush puts it: This cautious approach to international criminal law contributes to the conservative nature of 
the Russian doctrine of international law, which is still suffering from the Soviet influence. In particular, its 
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Perhaps the worst offence of the liberal/illiberal distinction lies, then, in its tendency to smooth 
out differences and exaggerate similarities. Put differently it over-determines and under-
determines; it explains too little and too much. Like Roele’s, Anna Dolidze’s fine paper on the 
way in which states speak international law proposes a fresh and arresting distinction between 
states (or cultures) that speak international law as native speakers and those that have been 
socialised into international society more latterly or who will forever, no matter how proficient 
they become, be “non-native”. While Chan and Muller focus on China as an emerging 
complication in the way we might think of liberal international order Dolidze’s paper focusses on 
Russia, “….a non-native speaker, [which] has perceived international law with two rhetorical 
moves: as a disaffected foreigner and as an empowered multilingual subject who aspires to 
uphold and interpret the rules of the language recently acquired” (1). Dolidze greatly complicates 
the image we have of Russian international law (instrumental, opportunistic, crude) by showing 
how non-native speakers are able to switch modes in ways not open to the native speaker. A 
state like Russia then is granted the freedom to defy international law in some circumstances (by 
emphasising the foreignness of that law) and control and enforce it in others (by exercising its 
grammatical competence) (at 4). Dolidze’s paper, then, goes a long way to explain how a 
“revolutionary” state like Russia also managed to enjoy the benefits of Great Power privilege and 
it is a useful lens through which to explore and understand Russia’s apparent volte faces on 
questions of sovereignty (in Kosovo and Crimea). Ultimately, the fluency/non-fluency is an 
original and bold way of thinking into the behaviour of the new hegemons (China, Russia, Iran) 
as well as the history of international law.28   
Of course, Russia’s behaviour may be just the typical activity of a great power whether liberal or 
illiberal. Charlotte Steinorth, in her provocatively titled and well-argued paper, “Russia, the 
Security Council and the Return of History”, shows how members of the Security Council, 
liberal or illiberal, move back and forth between advancing the values of peace or sovereignty in 
some cases, and more humanitarian norms in other cases. A form of liberal interventionism may 
have briefly flourished as semi-official Council policy just after the Cold War but more recently, 
with the fading of liberal-democratic confidence, a more nuanced picture has emerged and again 
we have two liberalisms co-existing (un)comfortably in the legal positions taken, and political 
rhetoric deployed, by each of the P5.29  
Reading these papers together, and hearing some of them delivered in Tallinn so close to the 
Russian border, I get a sense of Russia’s many faces: non-native speaker, Great Power par 
excellence, illiberal neo-tyranny, liberalising hegemon, opportunist. John Haskell, in a probing 
account of the uses of Russia in international political culture, inverts things a little by showing 
how Russia is an object of international law and diplomacy, a zone “comprehensively identified 
with a set of negative connotations, from Stalin’s Gulag to security state totalitarianism.” (at 1). 
But Haskell’s informed and stylish paper in a sense brings us back to the liberal/illiberal split. 
For him, this idea has gained renewed power and traction in recent projections and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reluctance to recognise individuals as subjects of international law, its cautious approach to customary international 
law and direct application of international law in the domestic legal order make it seem very uncomfortable with the 
idea of international criminal responsibility.” (at p 5).  
28 See, too, Lauri Mälksoo, The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: A Civilizational Dialogue with 
Europe, 19 EJIL (2008) 211, 217.  
29 Steinorth, at 3-4. 
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characterisations of Russia on the part of the Western diplomatic elite and media. Russia has 
(been) returned to (illiberal) history. But the world in which the binaries of liberalism-illiberalism 
or rule of law-tyranny predominate is a world in desperate need of interrogation. Its ruins lies all 
around us (the disasters of shock therapy, or the Iraq Wars); according to Haskell it is time to 
penetrate “the tournament of shadows” (14-15).        
…………. 
In the end, then, the tenor of the papers in Tallinn tended to be critical but, in some respects, 
liberalism, in all its variants, remains alive and well. To return to Oakeshott, liberalism has turned 
into a conversation among liberals, a liberalism of liberalism. And the liberal values of 
conversation, openness and variety are well worth preserving. Indeed, when gays and lesbians are 
discriminated against in the former Eastern bloc, the appeal of what we might think of as 
“traditional’ liberal values is potent. In the paper by Akeksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias and Anna 
Sledzinska-Simon, it is these values that are defended in the face of outright repression (the 
current spate of anti-gay laws being enacted in Russia and Lithuania) and the excessive forms of 
value-pluralism (extending the margin of appreciation too far) that might be used to defend such 
practices. Liberalism has in different ways been captured by, or associated too closely with, the 
reversion to legalism or constitutionalism in times of crisis or the imposition of a thoroughly 
attenuated and shop-worn set of prescriptive devices. But there remains plenty of space for a 
different liberalism: liberalism as a Socratic conversation, “dialectical and, at last, lyrical”.30   
                                                          
30 Gray, 86.  
